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NEW USES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
NORTH PACIFIC
DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON*
INTRODUCTION
For readers of this symposium it is not necessary to document the
increasing concern that is being expressed throughout the world over
the widening disparity between population and food supplies. Al-
though rapidly innovative food technology is a familiar feature of high-
income, industrialized societies, the international economy as a whole is
so imbalanced in natural resource allocation, productivity, and distri-
bution that apparently relatively little can be done to alleviate food
shortages in the more populous and less developed areas of the world.
Yet fish, a highly concentrated protein source found in abundance
throughout the world, constitutes a priceless resource for protein-
hungry populations, and fishing can provide an occupation for many
and generate income efficiently in underdeveloped economies.' In this
view, the "have not" perspective, marine fisheries provide a challenge
to those charged with responsibility for the poor and hungry.2
* M.A., 1952, LL.B., 1955, St Andrews University; M.C.L., 1958, McGill Univer-
sity; LL.M., 1959, J.S.D., 1962, Yale University; Research Associate, Harvard Law
School.
"Although the size of the natural resource base is not now believed, among Wes-
tern economists, to be a necessarily crucial factor in determining the rate of eco-
nomic growth, the existence of valuable fishery resources close to the coast of a
developing country suggests an obvious form of economic growth. See H. BARNETT &
C. MORSE, SCARCITY AND GROWTH: THE EcoNoMIcs OF NATURAL RESOURCE AvAiL-
ABILITY (1963) and C. BOTTEMANNE, PRINCIPLES OF FISHERY DEVELOPMENT (1959).
Many economists now regard the fishing industry of poor countries as a good choice
for development, since it tends to stimulate the growth of many subsidiary industries,
such as building and repairing ships, fishing gear manufacture, ice plants, cold
storage, and transportation. Compared with other natural resource and extractive
industries, fishing can provide employment and income at a fairly low level of in-
vestment cost. In the jargon, the fishing industry rates high as a potential generator
of overall economic "take-off." But the lack of a refrigerated transportation system
in most developing countries limits the potential domestic market for fresh fish to
local coastal or near-coastal areas. To supply larger areas considerable investment
has to be made in fish preservation technology, and it has been suggested that some
developing countries use their capital and fishing resources more efficiently in earn-
ing foreign exchange with which to stimulate economic growth. A profitable export
industry might be developed by concentrating on the packaging of luxury sea foods or
the large-scale production of fish meal.
Gittins, What Role Is There for Sea Fisheries in Developing Countries?, 5
FISHING NEWs INT'L, No. 8, at 27-28 (1966).
On various aspects of fish consumption, the economic role of fisheries, and the
world population-resource problem, see D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
FISHERIES 21-42, 131-40 (1965) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSTON].
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Estimates of the potential food resources of the oceans vary, and all
are subject to correction by unforeseen developments in marine engi-
neering and food technology.3 Even within the present limits of tech-
nology a distinction has to be maintained between the physically at-
tainable and the economically available. But at least it seems to be
generally agreed that "the role of the sea in feeding the world's increas-
ing population will be ever more important."4 One important effect
of this increase in the capacity and necessity for rapid fishery develop-
ment in many waters has been the aggravation of existing problems of
allocating authority over the oceans of the world.
At the same time, the more developed countries of the Northern
Hemisphere have reached a level of such destructive efficiency in ex-
ploiting the well-known fisheries of Europe, North America and the
Northwest Pacific, that their governments have been induced to parti-
cipate in a growing number of national and international conservation
schemes,5 and their fleets have been forced by falling yields and rising
operating costs to turn increasingly to more distant and less familiar
waters.' In this view, the "have" perspective, the interaction of various
fishing fleets exploiting the same resource with an expanding tech-
nology, creates a more complex set of problems, aggravated by a
tangled history of international disputes over fishing rights and con-
flicting views on conservation needs.7
'The following statement appears in F. CHRISTY & A. SCOTT, THE COMMON
WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES 72-73 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CHRISTY & Scor] :
The estimates of the oceans' future productivity range widely from about
twice the present level of output to a billion metric tons or more. The conserva-
tive estimate, which is more an estimate of supply than of ultimate produc-
tivity, is based upon current average yields of fish for which there is an
established demand. It makes no allowance for the development of techniques
that would raise maximum sustainable yields, nor for the development of
demands for different species. The liberal estimate, on the other hand, is based
on physical and chemical rather than economic factors. The limiting factors are
the production of carbon and the feed efficiencies of the various levels of animal
life, up to those of the second-stage carnivores. It is interesting to note under
this theory that ultimate productivity might be 10 million metric tons if it
referred to first-stage carnivores, and 100 billion tons if it referred to herbivor-
ous zooplankton. Thus it can be seen that the total potential output of the oceans
can be estimated at almost any level, depending upon the various assumptions
about kinds of product and stages of technology.
'Jackson, FAO Fisheries: Next Big Step, 5 FISHING NEWS INT'L, No. 2, at 270
(1966). Until 1964 Mr. Jackson was Executive Director of the International North
Pacific Fisheries Commission. He is now Assistant Director-General, Fisheries
Dep't, FAO.
'For a recent review of international schemes, see JOHNSTON 253-82, 358-411.
'E.g., the waters off Greenland, the waters off the Atlantic coast of Africa (both
north and south of the equator), and the Southeastern Pacific.
'This oversimplified distinction between "have" and "have not" perspectives,
turning chiefly on a country's capital base and technological capacity, should be com-
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Since all marine fisheries are either shared or shareable and con-
stitute a renewable resource, broad policy problems of fishery use,
both by "have" and "have not" fishing states, always have an interna-
tional aspect and involve considerations of both development and con-
servation.8 In few areas of international law is the challenge to our
reason and imagination so acute; and seldom do jurists so obviously
require the services of the natural sciences. Yet fishery science, now
engaging a small but growing number of specialists from biology and
related disciplines, is still unable to provide an adequate factual basis
for the sophisticated articulation of truly rational fishery policies. It
may be many decades before sufficient reliable data has been gathered
through scientific investigation of the world's marine resources to per-
mit the formulation of general behavioral models for all marketable
species in all commercially exploitable areas. On the other hand, the
dynamics of particular fish populations have become fairly familiar
over the years in certain closely studied areas, facilitating rough calcu-
lations of the effects of fishing on a resource. But even in highly
developed fisheries where substantial exploitation has been conducted
under scientific scrutiny, those hypotheses which have won critical
acceptance from biologists and adoption by administrators usually
rest on untested or untestable assumptions and minimal data regarding
pared with a distinction made in CHeisTy & ScoTT at 86:
There appear to be two views of the fishery resource that are currently preva-
lent. One is the long-range view that ignores the economic elements of supply
and demand and looks upon the ocean as a vast reservoir of undifferentiated
protein material. Those who hold this view tend to bemoan the size of the
present catch and advocate large investments in research to facilitate greater
output from this "underutilized" resource. Because they see great potential
output that can be shared by all they do not regard the problems of competition
and international conflict as being of very great significance for the future.
The other view, and the one we share, is that the fishery resource is not
undifferentiated but is a heterogeneous resource varying widely in size, in
location and depth, in density of population, and ease of capture. No single
species is inexhaustible nor is it free from the possibility of depletion. The
economic forces that dictate the intensity of fishing effort are concentrated on
single species or groups of species, and it is here that competition induces
conflict and international tension.
Since claims to fishery authority frequently conceal or confuse considerations of
development and conservation, it is important to maintain the distinction in order
to clarify the values involved and to recommend policies. Elsewhere the writer has
defined problems of development, or exploitation, as those referring to "the positive
and actual enjoyment of a physical resource, which is the object of production,
exchange, distribution, and consumption in the economic system," and problems of
conservation as those referring to the controlled, restricted or postponed enjoyment,
and the consequent perpetuation, of a renewable physical resource which is regarded
as a participant, along with capital, labor, and enterprise factors, in a social process
of continuously productive interactions. JoaNsToN 3-4. The term "conservation" is
often given a less restrictive connotation. When considerations of "exploitation"
and "conservation" are both highly relevant, as in the legal context of fishery policy
or authority, the all-embracing term "fishery use" might be adopted.
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the complex relationships between biotic and abiotic factors in the
shifting sea.9 Moreover, even the most rational program of conserva-
tion, inspired by sophisticated scientific studies, remains vulnerable to
the different approach of economists; 0 and even with a theoretical
reconciliation between these disciplines, the management of human
responses is possible only through the practice of political and diplo-
matic arts.
To add to the difficulties of international fishery use, the develop-
ment of the classical international law of the sea was almost entirely
irrelevant to the modern objective of a fully rational use of the sea.
Down the ages myth and romance have attached to the sea, feeding
minds and imaginations in many ways. In classical statecraft the sea
'The International Biological Programme, [hereinafter cited as IBP] established
in 1963 by the International Council of Scientific Unions, [hereinafter cited as
ICSU] has laid considerable emphasis on the need for ecological studies: "Although
the simplest way to study resources is to carry out investigations on the resources
themselves, it is also of great importance to make fundamental studies of the
processes in the production of these resources." IBP NEWS, No. 2, at 5 (1965). The
following appears id. at 58:
Success in forecasting and regulating fisheries will depend on an ... improve-
ment of our understanding of the basic ecological mechanisms which control
the abundant distribution and productivity of marine organisms of all kinds,
throughout the trophic chain in the sea.... The programme should form a
sufficiently representative time-series for the elucidation of general principles,
and it is essential that long-term variation shall be studied as this is a major
source of difficulty in planning the efficient utilization of marine resources in
many parts of the world .... The great weight of marine biology is already
directed towards the kind of objective which the sub-committee commends.
The main task of the International Biological Programme, therefore, will be to
seek ways of assisting and developing existing activities ... the primary re-
quirement for further development is a great increase of the scientific effort in
marine ecology. A doubling of manpower, equipment and facilities within the
next five years is considered to be the minimum rate of growth if there is to be
even modest progress towards the objectives of the International Biological
Programme.
10For a recent argument in favor of the economist's objective of maximum net
economic revenue, see CHRISTY & ScoTT 6-16 passim. For a brief discussion of con-
servation objectives, see JOHNSTON 49-55.
Economists have become interested in trying to analyze the effects of fishing at
varying levels of intensity. The results of their analyses often seem to depend on the
"assumptions of equilibrium" incorporated in their theoretical models. One school
of economists holds that a species or stock cannot be extinguished because it costs
too much to catch the last remaining individuals. With increased intensity of
fishing, it is argued, the density of the stock decreases and the cost of catching the
fish increases. And, with rising prices, demand falls, if it is reasonably elastic, so
as to relieve pressure on the stock and the processes of regeneration. Other econo-
mists point out that technological innovation can reduce price levels and induce
increased consumption and production. With increases in population and income
levels, and with changes in consumer preferences due to improvements in the preser-
vation and preparation of fishery products, it may become economical to fish lower
densities of a stock. Reproductive capacity, it is concluded, can conceivably be
reduced to zero if demand increases along with technological capability. See
CHRISTY & ScoTT 82-84. In using theoretical models, it should be remembered that
fish is a heterogeneous product; demand is not for fish, as such, but for specific kinds
of fish and fish products. Id. at 74.
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was a preserve of no particular interest. This changed when modern
nation-states reached out to secure their shores from military encroach-
ments. By then the juridical device of impressing a territorial imprint
upon a narrow fringe of coastal waters, to symbolize the seaward ex-
tension of land authority, was regarded as the most logical method of
explaining those customary and commonly expedient exclusive state
practices which had evolved along with the classical doctrine of free-
dom of the seas. Much of this historical legacy of duality remains."
When a fishery dispute arises today, it is still common for the com-
peting claim and counterclaim to be cast in terms which refer speci-
fically to the spatial bifurcation of the sea and the subsumption of
traditional rights according to the status of the area, although these
"rights of status" clearly fail to meet the fishery needs and opportuni-
ties of the 20th century. The basic doctrine of freedom of the seas,
which evolved in an age when fishery technology was extremely prim-
itive, was partly based on the prescientific belief in the inexhaustibility
of the fish in the sea. The basic counterdoctrine of the territorial sea,
also of preindustrial origin, created the modem absurdity of a man-
made dichotomy in the coastal waters where fish tend to congregate and
where fishing tends to be most profitable at a modest level of exploita-
tion. Because of this dichotomy and the rigidity of doctrine-assuring
complete permissiveness, in one, and absolute exclusiveness, in the
other-classical international law provided an unsuitable framework
for the postulation of rational concepts of fishery authority. Accord-
ingly, for those concerned with harnessing law to facilitate the most
rational use of the oceans for the common benefit of mankind, no em-
barrassment need be felt in seeking flexibility at the expense of con-
tinuity with the past.
I. THE PROCESS OF FISHERY AUTHORITY
A famous effort was made to codify the international law of the sea
at Geneva in 1958. From the formal diplomatic point of view, the code
dealing with fishery authority was the most difficult to consummate. 2
'The trends in claims to "unshared exploitation authority" and "shared ex-
ploitation authority" through legal doctrine and state practice are traced by the
writer elsewhere: JOHNSTrN 157-76, 303-17. On the need to reformulate the interna-
tional law of the sea in response to technological advances, see Johnston, Law,
Technology and the Sea, 55 CALiF. L. REv. 449 (1967) and Burke, Ocean Sciences,
Technology and the Future International Law of the Sea, Jan. 1966. See also note
15, infra.
" The deposit of ratification by the Netherlands on Feb. 18, 1966 brought into
force on March 20, 1966 the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.54 (1958). The other three
substantive conventions signed at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
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From a modern juridical point of view, however, the reluctance of
most governments to ratify the Convention on Fishing and Conserva-
tion of the Living Resources of the High Seas13 may be regarded as
sufficient justification for reconsidering the evolving decision-making
processes affecting solutions to the problems arising out of the exploita-
tion and conservation of the world's fishery resources.
In its new phase of development the international law of fisheries
will be shaped primarily by three types of participants in the process of
authoritative decision-making: 4 diplomatic, managerial, and arbitral.
Each of these types of decision-makers might be called upon to play
a role in the formulation of international fishery policy on three dif-
ferent levels: world communal, regional and subregional. The system
of international fishery authority need not be regarded as "vertical,"
corresponding with national models of authority. In one situation,
the failure to resolve a fishery dispute by diplomatic means at the
regional level might provide the way for a managerial solution at the
subregional level; in another situation, the inability of an arbitral tri-
bunal at the world community level to come to the heart of a conflict
of fishery interests through the application of world community pre-
scriptions might reflect the need for a re-evaluation of political, eco-
nomic and social factors by diplomats of the region where the conflict
arose. Perhaps in most situations problems of fishery authority at the
regional and subregional levels will not be amenable to solution by the
provision or application of new prescriptions by any kind of decision-
Seas at Geneva in 1958 came into force earlier: the Convention on the High Seas
on Sept. 30, 1962, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.53 (1958); the Convention on the
Continental Shelf on June 10, 1964, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.55 (1958); the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Continguous Zone on Sept. 10, 1964, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958) [hereinafter these conventions will be cited by
name only].
'On the effective date of this convention, ratifications or accessions had been
deposited by the following states: Australia, Cambodia, Columbia, Dominican
Republic, Finland, Haiti, Jamaica, Malagasay, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Uganda, the
United Kingdom, the United States of America, Upper Volta, and Venezuela.
Among those which did not even sign were: Chile, Ecuador, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Poland,
the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the U.S.S.R. Communist China was not
invited to do so. Among the nonratifiers, Peru, Japan, the People's Republic of
China, and USSR, the four leading fishing states, account for well over half of all
fish caught in the world. It might be noted that of the 22 states which brought the
treaty into effect, 12 adhered by accession.
"The concept of international law as a process of authoritative decision-making
has been developed chiefly through the writings of Professor Myres S. McDougal.
For its application to problems of coercion, see M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW
AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 39-59 (1961); to problems of outer space, see
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & I. VLASIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 94-137
(1963); to problems of the sea, see M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE OCEANS 36-51 (1961) ; and to fishery problems, see JOHNSTON 111-28.
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maker representing the world community. Decision-making for the
solution of present and future fishery problems can be expected to
function "diagonally'-if the geometric metaphor be retained-even
though the chief decision-makers in the world community, the nation-
states, are still arranged "horizontally" in legal theory, and the struc-
ture of authority within the world community continues to be studied
and described on the "vertical" plane.
A. World Community Fishery Authority
The prescriptions of traditional international law relating to fishery
use were derived from the regime of territorial waters and from the
concept of the freedom of the high seas. The latter concept was applied
universally outside territorial limits.' 5 Within its territorial sea the
coastal state was granted absolute, unshared authority over all fishery
activities, including of course the right to deny foreign access to its
stocks and the privilege of ignoring conservation needs. In the high
seas the fisherman of all states were assured immunity from interna-
tional restrictions of any kind-except that they were subject to the
general laws of navigation like all other seafarers-and, unless they
were bound by the actions of their own state, they were free to fish
without regard for conservation on the basis of equality with the
fishermen of all other states. Inevitably, the more advanced fishing
states in the Northern Hemisphere discovered the need for treaty ar-
rangements to redefine fishing rights, to prescribe norms of conduct
on the fishing grounds, and eventually, to stimulate joint inquiries into
the conservation needs of a shared resource and to recommend con-
servation measures.
Both the pattern of these treaty arrangements and the classical
doctrine of the international law of the sea are reflected in the conven-
tions signed at Geneva in 1958 at the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. In large measure, the delegates accepted both the
old and the new presented in the drafts prepared by the International
' Originally the high seas, or open sea, insusceptible of effective occupation or
conquest, was regarded not as an incomplete regime but as a "no-law" area. With
the development of marine technology, men and vessels brought their own status of
subjection to state authority into more distant waters, but pretentions aimed at im-
posing national or imperial authority over those waters were generally never accepted
as consonant with world community policy. The concept of "territorial waters"
emerged, in the minds of contemporaries, as a strictly limited seaward extension of
the coastal state's territorial regime, with a few modifications necessary to secure
international navigation from unnecessary interference. Today the concept of a "no-
law" area is generally regarded as repugnant to that of a world community based on
law.
1967]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Law Commission, at the instance of the General Assembly of the
United Nations. Basic to this attempt to codify the international law
of the sea was the old distinction between the territorial sea and
the high seas; in addition, recognition was given to a high seas zone
contiguous to the territorial sea, in which the coastal state was
granted special authority for specific purposes which did not include
the exploitation or conservation of fishery resources. 6 By way of inno-
vation, consent was given to the establishment of a regime of the
Continental Shelf within which the coastal state was granted "sov-
ereign rights" for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources of the Shelf.' 7 "Natural resources" was defined to include
certain fishery species: "living organisms belonging to sedentary spe-
cies, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, are im-
mobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant
physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.")8
The extent of the Continental Shelf varies enormously in different
parts of the world. Thus, some coastal states gained much more than
others from this conferral of absolute, unshared authority over seden-
tary fisheries. The significance of this is heightened by the diplomatic
failures in 1958 and 1960 to reach a formal two-thirds majority con-
sensus on uniform territorial limits or uniform exclusive fishing limits.
Hence, the codified international law of the sea does not provide uni-
form limits to the area within which coastal states may exercise abso-
lute, unshared authority over the exploitation of fisheries. In state
practice, divergent claims continue to be made to exclusive fishing
zones, sometimes beyond generally acceptable limits of the territorial
sea. This lack of equality must be construed as an abuse of the pro-
vision in the Convention on the High Seas which lists "freedom of
fishing," both for coastal and noncoastal states, as a component of the
freedom on the high seas. 9 It also puts in question the applicability of
1 Article 24(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone states:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the State may
exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regu-
lations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within the terri-
tory or territorial sea.
1Article 2(1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. No. A/
CONF.13/L.55(1958).
'181d. at art. 2(4).
"Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exer-
cised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of
[ VOL. 43 : 77
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the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas to those areas where extensive territorial claims have
been made by coastal states and challenged by noncoastal states.
However unavoidable politically, it is unfortunate that the first
world community fishery regime was carved out of the classical regime
of the high seas. Although the "high seas" covers a very large, if still
indefinite, proportion of the world's oceans---"all parts of the sea that
are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State"2 ---the limitation is logically untenable and fatal to any pro-
jected fishery regime, since fish pay as little attention to man-made
limits as the doctrinaires of territorial limits have paid to fish. The
establishment of spatially-defined and divided regimes, such as those of
the "contiguous zone" and the Continental Shelf, does not contribute
to the rational development of an international law of fisheries in an
age when many coastal states have purportedly extended the scope of
their authority without regard to the nature of fishery problems. As
ecological studies continue to show the interrelationships between in-
shore and offshore stocks, it is difficult to see how some regional and
subregional schemes of fishery authority can be expected to conduct ra-
tional programs of fishery use if they must limit their activities to
irrelevant man-made zones.
If, on the other hand, the future of the international law of the sea
lies with "functional regimes"-which would be favorable to the ra-
tional treatment of problems of old uses, such as fisheries, military
security, transport and communication, and of newer uses, such as
storage, power, mineral exploitation, and weather modification, and of
emerging uses, such as residence and recreation-then the texts signed
at Geneva in 1958 are riddled with inconsistencies. The chief incon-
sistency lies in the coexistence of the historically derived "status re-
gimes" of the territorial sea and high seas with incomplete "functional
regimes" for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary purposes, for
the exploration and exploitation of mineral and sedentary living re-
sources, and for the settlement of some kinds of fishery disputes within
the "status regime" of the high seas.
international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal
States: (1) Freedom of navigation;(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of
international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the
interest of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
Id. art. 1.
19671
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Apart from the restatement of the "right of fishing" on the high
seas," the Convention of Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas is entirely concerned with a framework of
principles and procedures to assure the conservation of stocks in the
high seas:
1. Universal Duty to Conserve. All states were placed under the
duty "to adopt, or to co-operate with other states in adopting, such
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas."22 Conservation
programs, it was asserted, should be formulated "with a view to secur-
ing in the first place a supply of food for human consumption. 2 3
It is submitted that this language tends to conceal the existence of
two related but distinct developments: the necessity to develop marine
resources on an increasing scale of activity, in order to augment food
supplies for rising populations; and the necessity to discipline and
correlate intensive fishing effort according to the most relevant socio-
economic factors in light of the best available scientific knowledge.
The "have not" countries will continue to be almost entirely moti-
vated by the first, the "haves" increasingly by the second.24 World
community prescriptions should place equal emphasis on both. Ac-
cordingly, the "universal duty to conserve" should be restated as one of
two basic and complementary principles: first, the principle of re-
source development, which enjoins international law to facilitate the
development of the world's marine resources, and which may even be
interpreted to place an obligation on states to assist in that develop-
ment; second, the principle of nonimpairment, according to which
practices tending to impair stock productivity are deemed contrary to
the interest of the world community and all users are under obligation
to conform their behaviour to conservation requirements. It is impor-
'Article 1(1) of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas states:
1. All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high
seas, subject
(a) to their treaty obligations,
(b) to the interests and rights of coastal States as provided for in this Con-
vention, and
(c) to the provisions contained in the following articles concerning conser-
vation of the living resources of the high seas.
Id. art. 1 (2).
Id. art. 2.
,The official records of the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea,
held at Geneva in 1958 and 1960, show a clear rift in fishery policy between the
"haves" and the "have nots." Certain debates indicate a division between coastal
fishing interests and distant fishing interests. The two distinctions are related since
only "have" fishing states have distant fishing interests.
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tant to have these principles established in law in order to assure uni-
versal official discouragement of the two main forms of waste: under-
fishing and overfishing.2 5
2. Special Interest of the Coastal State. The Convention recognized
that a coastal state "has a special interest in the maintenance of the
productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adja-
cent to its territorial sea?" 6 which entitles it "to take part on an equal
footing in any system of research and regulation for purposes of con-
servation of the living resources of the high seas in that area, even
though its nationals do not carry on fishing there."IT Noncoastal user
states are placed under an obligation to enter into negotiations with the
coastal (user or nonuser) state, at the latter's request, in order to
reach agreement on appropriate conservation measures.28 In the ab-
sence of an agreement within six months of the request, the coastal
state's special interest entitles it to adopt unilateral measures of con-
servation, which are binding on noncoastal user states provided three
requirements are met: (a) that there is a need for urgent application
of conservation measures in the light of existing knowledge of the
fishery; (b) that the measures adopted are based on appropriate
scientific findings; and (c) that such measures do not discriminate in
form or in fact against foreign fishermen2 Procedures are set out to
ensure the coastal state's participation in international conservation
authority, when the latter deals with a resource close to the state's
territorial limits, even though the state is a nonuser of the particular
resource.
80
At the 1958 and 1960 Conferences on the Law of the Sea some dele-
gations unsuccessfully attempted to establish a principle which would
grant a coastal state with an exceptionally heavy socio-economic de-
pendence upon fishery stocks close to its shores preferential rights of
fishing within more extensive limits than those enjoyed by other coastal
states. 8' As it stands in the text, the concept of "special interest"
=See Joaizs o 149-51. Although these two principles seem to be directed
against the two most conspicuous examples of resource waste, underfishing and
overfishing, it should be remembered that waste takes other forms, such as underuse
of catches (rejection of "unmarketable" species), and spoilage of the resource (pollu-
tion).
'Article 6(1) of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas.
"'Id. art. 6(2).
Id. art. 6(3).
SId. art. 7.
Id. arts. 8-12.
'Iceland is the most obvious candidate for preferential treatment on this ground.
For a summary of the Geneva debates on this question, see JOHNSTON 282-88.
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applies equally to all coastal states, user and nonuser, by the mere
reason of their contiguity, and certain privileges can be enjoyed if the
state can discharge the onus of proving that the prescribed require-
ments have been fulfilled. Accordingly, the "special interest" granted
uniformly to coastal states is typical neither of the inclusive rights
subsumed under the rubric of shared authority, within the regime of
the high seas, nor of the exclusive rights subsumed under the rubric
of unshared authority, within the regime of the territorial sea. The
special authority residing in coastal states by reason of their special
interest might be described as modified conservation authority. 2
"Note, however, that many states have supported the "special interest" principle
in the belief that it will entitle them, in certain situations, to unilateral action and
exclusive practices. For this reason, it may be regarded in some important aspects
as a development in the history of claims to unshared authority. Id. at 344-55.
The apparently monopolistic authority of the coastal state over the exploitation of
sedentary fisheries on the shelf, granted by the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
is not brought expressly under the principle of the special interest of the coastal state
but seems to be modified in effect by the terms of art. 13(1) of the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas:
The regulation of fisheries conducted by means of equipment embedded in the
floor of the sea in areas of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a State
may be undertaken by that State where such fisheries have long been maintained
and conducted by its nationals, provided that non-nationals are permitted to
participate in such activities on an equal footing with nationals except in areas
where such fisheries have by long usage been exclusively enjoyed by such
nationals. Such regulations will not, however, affect the general status of the
areas as high seas.
If this article is intended to apply independently of the special interest principle
but in conjunction with the provisions of the Convention on the Continental Shelf,
then it seems that in the situation where the coastal state has "long" shared the
sedentary fishery with a noncoastal state, the coastal state has only modified authority
over exploitation and conservation because of the nondiscriminatory clause. On the
same assumptions, the coastal state seems entitled to unshared authority over exploi-
tation and conservation in situations where its nationals have "long" exploited a
fishery by fixed equipment exclusive of foreigners. In all other situations, vis-a-vis
nonuser states and relative newcomers, it might be supposed that even the nonuser
coastal state would be entitled to unshared authority over exploitation by reason of
its "sovereign rights," granted in the Convention on the Continental Shelf; and if
noncoastal states in these two categories cannot acquire exploitation authority,
because of the coastal state's "sovereign rights," it is difficult to see how they could
ever acquire the interest to establish a right to participate in conservation authority.
This reasoning is based on a "literal" reading of "sovereign rights," which is itself
inconsistent with the rights afforded to the "long" user noncoastal state in art. 13(1),
quoted above.
If, on the other hand, art. 13(1) and the provisions of the Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf have to be taken together with the "special interest" provisions in
order to determine the coastal state's authority over sedentary species caught by
"equipment embedded in the floor of the sea in areas of the high seas adjacent to the
territorial sea," then art. 13(1) is both tautologous (since the coastal state is assured
participation in conservation authority under the "special interest" principle) and
incomplete (since the coastal state's conservation authority is not limited to the
situation where the fisheries "have been long maintained and conducted by its
nationals").
In practice, it might be supposed that disputes in these situations will be rare.
In the recent Franco-Brazilian lobster dispute these articles were much discussed,
although neither party was bound by them, but the debate also focused on the bio-
logical question whether lobsters belonged to those organisms "which, at the harvest-
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In order to clarify the significance of special interests at the world
community level of prescriptions in the international law of fisheries,
it is important to restate another basic principle which must be re-
garded as complementary to that of special interest, namely that of
general interest. By this principle it is presumed a priori to be in the
general interest of mankind-present and future generations-that a
physically shareable fishery resource located in a nondomestic domain
should be shared on an inclusive basis, and that since the resource is
renewable, all the users and interested nonusers should participate in
schemes to ensure its most rational use. This presumption in favor of
the internationalization of fishery authority is made in the belief that it
tends to promote the widest and most equitable distribution of benefits
that can be derived from the seaY3 However, it could happen that the
coastal or near-coastal state is in the best position to direct conserva-
tion policy and, provided that this policy does not discriminate un-
fairly against other states, it might be in the best interest of all ex-
ploiters that the coastal state be granted unilateral enforcement powers
to ensure the most effective means of making all exploiters conform to
the requirements of conservation policy. At the same time, with a view
to future changes in needs (consumer demand) and opportunities
(technology and trade), it is difficult to see why the complementary
concept of special interest would necessarily be limited to coastal states
and conservation authority.34
On the other hand, it lies in the nature of the special interest concept
that it prove its case. At the present time a clear world community
consensus grants coastal states an exclusive interest in fishery and all
other activities within uniform territorial limits that it still cannot de-
fine. Although clear world community consensus still cannot be found
to define the extent of these territorial limits or of uniform limits
within which a coastal state would be entitled to unshared exploitation
authority, the basic policy of international fishery authority should not
be regarded as dependent on reconciliation of these divergent claims.
able stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in
constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil," as required by art. 2(4) of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf. See Azzam, The Dispute between France
and Brazil over Lobster Fishing in the Atlantic, 13 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 1453 (1964).
'oHN TON 151.
' This view of the complementary relationship between "general interest" (sus-
taining schemes of "shared authority" and certain inclusive principles and proce-
dures in schemes of "modified authority") and "special interest" (sustaining schemes
of "unshared authority" and certain exclusive principles and procedures in schemes
of "modified authority") is very close to the view that the "common interest" of the
world community lies in an "economic balance of exclusive and inclusive uses." See
M cDOUGAX & BuRun, supra note 14, at 51-56.
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There is now an accelerating trend towards a multiplicity of regional
and subregional schemes of fishery authority. Within the policy limits
prescribed at the world communal level, more detailed prescriptions
will have to be made by these schemes to adjust the balance between
inclusive and exclusive uses for particular areas and stocks in each
region. In this way, claims to special interest can be made more
specific and be dealt with by the appropriate diplomatic managerial or
arbitral decision-maker referring to the most relevant factors. This
degeneralization of references to "special interest" will facilitate the
clarification of exploitation and conservation policy for the regional
and subregional schemes of authority.
3. Voluntary Negotiation and Compulsory Arbitration. Two im-
portant features of the Convention were the statement of the principle
that conservation problems should be solved, whenever possible, "on
the basis of international co-operation through the concerted action of
all the States concerned, 5 and by the establishment of a much dis-
puted system of compulsory arbitration of fishery disputes which prove
in the last resort to be incapable of resolution through voluntary dip-
lomatic negotiations. 6 Most delegates endorsed the sentiment that
voluntary agreement is always preferable to the imposition of solutions
by third parties, however enlightened and impartial the process of ad-
judication. But it should be noted that those same delegates voted for
a system of "directed negotiation," whereby user states were placed
under obligation to enter into negotiations for agreement on conserva-
tion policy. It was also generally accepted at Geneva that the codifica-
tion should not impair the effectiveness of existing schemes of fishery
authority; but because of the pressure asserted by many developing
nations this principle was subordinated to that of the coastal state's
special interest and found expression only in two resolutionsY Im-
'Preamble to the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas.
"Id. arts. 9-12.
' The Draft Resolution on International Fishery Conservation Conventions
provides:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Taking note of the
opinion of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea, held in Rome in April/May 1955 (as expressed in
paragraph 43 of its report, as to the efficacy of International conservation
organizations in furthering the conservation of the living resources of the Sea;
Believing that such organizations are valuable instruments for the co-ordina-
tion of scientific effort upon the problem of fisheries and for the making of
agreements upon conservation measures,
Recommends:
(1) That States concerned should co-operate in establishing the necessary conser-
vation regime through the medium of such organizations covering particular
[ VoL. 43 : 77
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NORTH PACIFIC
plicit in these resolutions is the recognition that many fishery problems
are best treated within the framework of regional and subregional
organizations, where diplomatic and managerial decision-makers with
expert knowledge special to the region or area already exist.
Obviously, it is desirable to seek solutions to fishery problems in
free negotiation involving all interested parties. Unfortunately, the
text of the Convention does not stress the obligation of all users shar-
ing a resource to cooperate, in the general interest, with existing re-
gional or subregional schemes of authority. It should be emphasized
that maximum participation by interested parties in the making of
regional community policy serves to minimize distorted perceptions of
general and special interest and to dispel the illusion that the national
interest suffers from becoming only one of several legitimate factors in
the making of general policies for the most rational use of the region's
resources. In balancing the general and special interest in favor of the
coastal state, the Convention seems to reflect, and may tend to stimu-
late, the same kind of economic nationalism that motivates claims to
extensive territorial and exclusive fishing limits.
Much more controversy was engendered by the Geneva debate on
the provisions for compulsory arbitration,38 and it is certain that the
failure of some signatory states to support the Convention is due prin-
cipally to their reluctance to accept this principle which seems to chal-
lenge their sovereignty. As the pressures on shared and shareable re-
areas of the high seas or species of living marine resources and conforming in
other respects with the recommendations contained in the report of the Rome
Conference;(2) That these organizations should be used so far as practicable for the conduct
of the negotiations between States envisaged under articles 52, 53, 54, and 55, for
the resolution of any disagreements and for the implementation of agreed
measures of conservation.
The Draft Resolution on Co-operation in Conservation Measures in the Adjacent
High Seas provides:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Taking note of the
opinion of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea, held in Rome in April/Mfay 1955, as reported in
paragraphs 43(a), 54 and others of the Report, that any effective conservation
management system must have the participation of all States engaged in sub-
stantial exploitation of the stock or stocks of living marine organisms which are
the object of the conservation management system or having a special interest
in the conservation of that stock or stocks,
Recommends to the coastal States that, in the cases where a stock or stocks of
fish or other living marine resource inhabit both the fishing areas under their
jurisdiction and areas of the adjacent high seas, they should co-operate with
international conservation agencies as may be responsible for the development
and application of conservation measures in the adjacent high seas, in the
adoption and enforcement, as far as practicable, of the necessary conservation
measures on fishing areas under their jurisdiction.
'For a review of the Geneva debate on compulsory arbitration, see JoHrOrN
417-23.
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sources increase in number and intensity, it is inevitable that certain
types of disputes will prove unamenable to consensual decision and
that recourse to third party settlement will be the only hope of pro-
viding a rational satisfaction. Because of the technical difficulties in-
herent in fishery disputes, arbitration seems the most appropriate form
of adjudication. It seems elementary that if participating governments
are truly committed to the continuance of international schemes of
fishery authority, they must be prepared to accept in advance the
merits of a system of last resort arbitration for the impartial settlement
of disputes which cannot be resolved without reference to scientific
and technical considerations. Regional fishery disputes which cannot
be resolved through negotiation may be expected to involve choices
which the parties regard as vital to their economic policies. But unlike
problems which are deemed to involve strategic "necessity" or ideo-
logical "commitment," fishery problems are amenable to rational ana-
lysis. If "directed negotiation" fails to produce the spirit of rational
analysis, it seems both fair and realistic that the next step should be
compulsory arbitration. 9 Once the arbitration tribunal has completed
its analysis, it might be more sensible for it to issue a recommended
plan based on a broad examination of the facts surrounding the dispute
rather than to exercise its full competence in handing down a "binding
decision." If it is cynically suggested that rational analysis is the last
thing that the disputants would accept, it should be stated that this
possibility is the strongest reason for insisting on compulsory arbitra-
tion as the last resort; and that, at second best, the threat of rational
analysis would serve to drive the disputants into a negotiated settle-
ment.4 o
4. Biological Criteria of Conservation Policy. At the International
Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of
the Sea, held at Rome in 1955, it was agreed that "the principal ob-
jective of conservation of the living resources of the sea is to obtain
" The entire Soviet bloc was opposed to the principle of compulsory arbitration,
and only Yugoslavia signed the convention. Among the opponents of the principle in
debate were Ghana and Uruguay, which signed but have not ratified, and Mexico,
which did not sign but has recently acceded.
"It can be argued that with increasing regionalization of fishery authority,
nation-states will gradually become less hostile to compulsory arbitration in practice,
and that a regional system of arbitration over fishery disputes is more likely to build
up a pool of expert adjudicators with special knowledge of a region's resources.
Perhaps the decisions of such experts on the regional level are more likely to be
accepted as "binding on the states concerned" after their reputation for expertise and
impartiality has been confirmed by experience within a scheme of regional or sub-
regional authority.
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the optimum sustainable yield so as to secure a maximum supply of
food and other marine products. ' 41 This biological objective of the
optimum sustainable yield was accepted more or less uncritically by
the International Law Commission and found its way into the 1958
Convention where conservation was defined as "the aggregate of the
measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those
resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine
products."42 As we have seen, two criteria to be applied to conserva-
tion measures adopted unilaterally by the coastal state refer to "the
existing knowledge of the fishery" and "appropriate scientific find-
ings;" 4 moreover, two requirements for the determination of conser-
vation policy disputes in other situations are "that scientific findings
demonstrate the necessity of conservation measures" and "that the
specific measures are based on scientific findings and are practicable. '44
The similarity of this language and its consistency with conserva-
tion objectives stated in a number of regional conventions conceal the
fact that the articulation of conservation policy objectives has proved
to be one of the most controversial questions in recent fishery litera-
ture, especially since 1953 when economists started to formulate the
objective of an economic optimum.45 The definition of conservation
objectives goes to the heart of the most complex problems in fishery
science and involves issues in political philosophy affecting a state's
economic planning and foreign policy.4" Moreover, in the actual prac-
tice of fishery management, both the biological optimum and the eco-
nomic optimum are unattainable at present. All these facts together,
'Report of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea, para. 18 (1955).
'Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, art. 2.
13 Id. art. 7.
,1 Id. art. 10.
" Some of the earlier economic papers on fishery conservation are: DIVIsIoN OF
BALANCED INTERNATIONAL GROWTH, NETHERLANDS ECONOMICS INSTITUTE, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF OFFSHORE FISHERIES AND THE ECONOmICS OF CHOICE (1958); THE
ECONOMICS OF FISHERIES (Turvey & Wiseman, eds. 1957); Crutchfield, Common
Property Resources and Factor Allocation, 22 CAN. J. EcoN. & POL. Sci. 292 (1956);
Gordon, An Economic Approach to the Optimum Utilization of Fishery, 10 J. FISH.
REs. BD. CAN. 442 (1953); Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property
Resource: the Fishery, 62 J. POL. EcoN. 124 (1954); Scott, The Fishery: the Objec-
tives of Sole Ozwnership, 63 J. POL. EcoN. 116 (1955).
"'Many biologists and administrators, as well as economists, accept the argument
that economic efficiency is a valid base goal in fishery management without being
able to accept the logical conclusion that entry to a fishery should be limited to the
number of exploiters that represents the most efficient degree of fishing intensity.
' The various biological and economic approaches to fishery management are well
represented in BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
(Crutchfield ed. 1959) (Proceedings of a conference held in Seattle under the auspices
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it is believed, constitute sufficient reason for omitting the criteria of
conservation policy from a world community code that addresses itself
to all resources, all regions, and all users, in their almost infinite
diversity. At the present stage in the developing international law of
fisheries, world community level prescriptions should not purport to
spell out world community fishery conservation objectives beyond
espousal of the principles of resource development and nonimpair-
ment of stocks. It is suggested instead that the formulation of con-
servation policy is pre-eminently a task to be undertaken rigorously
at the regional level, where all interested parties can participate and
make contributions in the light of the most relevant scientific findings
and socio-economic factors. As knowledge and expertise increase, it
may become feasible to submit challenges to regional or subregional
conservation policy to arbitration, first at the subregional or regional
level and then, on appeal, at the world community level, through a
"vertical" system of expert tribunals. To envisage the submission of
such difficult policy disputes to arbitral settlement, it is necessary to
foresee the sophisticated use of "Brandeis brief" advocacy by the in-
terested parties. What might sound slightly unreal in the 20th century
may prove to be less than fantastic in the next.
5. Summary and Appraisal. It is consistent with the main provisions
of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Re-
sources of the High Seas to postulate six principles which are already
in the process of assimilation as world community level prescriptions
of fishery authority: the principles of resource development, of non-
impairment of stocks, of collective authority in the general interest,
of limited privilege in the special interest, of voluntary negotiation and
of compulsory arbitration. But on this world community level it is
believed to be unnecessary and unwise to articulate more detailed
criteria of conservation policy purporting to have universal application,
of the College of Fisheries and the Department of Economics of the University of
Washington, Feb. 17-19, 1959).
It is generally acknowledged that there must be a vast increase in scientific data
before biological objectives can be intelligently pursued. Less attention has been
given to the inadequacy of economic studies which depend on the figures of reported
income and reported catches, despite the common practice of private sharing arrange-
ments, in certain sections of the American fishing industry, between nonowner
skippers and their crew. These unreported sharing arrangements are probably con-
fined mostly to smaller vessels operating on a fairly small scale of organization and
to species which are caught incidentally to the major commercial venture and there-
fore deemed to be of little interest to the owner, though still marketable. In sections
of the American industry where these practices are prevalent, average incomes may
be at least $1,000 above the figures reported by the industry.
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whether for the management of conservation programs or for the
settlement of fishery disputes.
The opportunities, responsibilities and limitations of making fishery
policies on the world community level should be closely related to
those on regional and subregional levels. The full range of authorita-
tive responses to international fishery problems will be discovered only
within a flexible, interlocking system of schemes of authority-of
"split-level" authorities-which will permit appropriate initial choices
to be made by interested parties for the prevention or settlement of
disputes by diplomatic, managerial and arbitral methods at the three
levels of organization.
The six principles focus chiefly on the goal of rational development
of a world community resource through regional and subregional
schemes of authority whose scope would be proportionate to the distri-
bution of commercially exploitable stocks in the region. In this area of
development and welfare, these relatively new principles and proce-
dures may be regarded as participating in the evolution of a larger
international law of cooperation which must seek to adapt investment
and technology to a wide variety of problems of resource use. Much of
the literature dealing with this larger international law of cooperation
tends to focus on the developing country. But the problems of develop-
ing countries are only one aspect of the problems of international
fishery authority, and many fishery problems originate beyond terri-
torial limits.
Regional and subregional arrangements will be increasingly valuable
as the most suitable framework for working out the implications of the
six world community prescriptions of fishery authority.
B. Regional and Subregional Fishery Authority
1. Present Operations and Recommendations for the Future. The
enormous diversities in the process of fishery use-in all the factors
affecting the production, distribution, and consumption of fishery prod-
ucts-seem to ensure that the main thrust in the developing pattern of
international fishery authority will be provided at regional and sub-
regional levels. These diversities will constitute the main impediments
to the discovery of acceptable and adequate solutions and to the erec-
tion of mutually satisfactory standards in the exploitation and con-
servation of shared and shareable resources. At present there is a
remarkable variety of regional and subregional fishery organizations,
possessed of varying degrees of authority, pursuing different objectives
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by various means." Some of these organizations are directed only at
the coordination and stimulation of scientific research; 41 others are
authorized to make recommendations to the member states for joint
conservation of the stocks;50 still others have been granted a degree of
autonomy, and their own staff, to implement measures adopted in their
own discretion, albeit subject to the approval of the member states."'
A scheme of conservation authority is focused either on a specific stock
or species or on a geographically defined area of waters. Stock-based
programs tend to be more restricted-subregional-in scope, but the
International Whaling Commission has jurisdiction over all whaling
activities in the world, and the projected Atlantic tuna commission will
have jurisdiction over the conservation of all tuna in the entire Atlantic
Ocean, including adjacent waters such as the Mediterranean, the Ca-
ribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. 2 Area-based programs are usually
more extensive in scope, though sometimes confined to enclosed wa-
ters.53
" For a recent analysis of intergovernmental fishery organizations, with special
reference to the projected Atlantic Tuna Commission, see Carroz & Roche, The
Proposed International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tnas, 61 Am.
J. INT'L L. 673 (1967). See also Burke, Aspects of Internal Decision-Making Proc-
esses in Inter-Governmental Fishery Commissions, 43 WAsH. L. Rlv. 115 (1967),
where the author examines the grant of capacity, membership provisions, structure.
objectives, and distribution of authority functions within eight prominent com-
missions.
40 Most of these have been set up in recent years under FAO sponsorship, e.g., the
Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council and the General Fisheries Council for the Mediter-
ranean. But the oldest and most distinguished is the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea [hereinafter cited as ICES], which was formed in 1902 by
nine Baltic and North Sea states.
' The International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, for exam-
ple, has divided the region into 23 areas according to the distribution of species;
each area is studied, through national research facilities, by a panel representing the
states that exploit the dominant stocks in that region. On the basis of national re-
search findings for its area, the panel proposes regulatory measures to the Commis-
sion, which reviews the recommendations and refers them in turn for joint action
by the member governments.
"'The best examples are the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission
and the International Pacific Halibut Commission, both representing Canada and
the United States, and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. The Atlantic
Tuna Commission is authorized to carry out its own research, but will be concerned
primarily with coordinating national research programs.2 See note 61 infra.
' The Baltic Sea, being adjacent to the Northeast Atlantic Ocean, might have
been included in an extensive area-based fishery organization, but the Baltic fishing
states have preferred to make their own bilateral and multipartite arrangements to
regulate fishing. After careful research by the ICES early in the century, a Baltic
Convention was concluded in 1929 by Denmark, Germany, Poland, Danzig, and
Sweden, prohibiting trawling and providing for a closed season. A similar conven-
tion was concluded in 1932 by Sweden, Denmark and Norway for the protection of
the plaice fishery in the Skagerrak, Kattegat and the Sound. The most recent de-
velopment in that area is the Baltic Sea Salmon Conservation Agreement, which
went into effect on March 1, 1966, binding Denmark, Sweden and the Federal
Republic of Germany. It is reported that these conservation measures may also be put
into effect by the other exploiters of the Baltic salmnon-Poland, Finland, and the
[ VOL. 43 : 77
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NORTH PACIFIC
The significance of the distinction between regional and subregional
decision-making for future schemes of authority will be most evident
in a region where a decision-making institution representing all the
fishing states of the region coexists with a number of other decision-
making institutons representing only certain of these states and focus-
ing on more limited areas or on specific stocks or species. Such a
system-a "split-level" regional system-of fishery authority would
be subordinate to policy prescribed at the world community level, but
within that "constitutional" framework it should be allowed to develop
according to the needs and opportunities of the whole region. 4 The
various subregional schemes within a region need not, and presumably
would not, bear an identical relationship to the regional scheme, and
the split-level system might operate quite differently from one region
to another. It is envisaged, however, that it would become commonly
acceptable in each region for the regional scheme to have at least some
kind of supervisory authority over the policies of the subregional
schemes, so that it can exert a coordinating influence and facilitate the
most rational use of the region's resources as a whole.
It is clear that the rapidly innovative technology of the highly in-
dustralized fishing states, such as Japan and the Soviet Union, will soon
involve their fishermen in almost year-round activities in virtually
every commercially important fishing region in the world.5" The re-
gional scheme, therefore, would have to be open to all regional par-
Soviet Union-even though they have not ratified the agreement. 28 Co. FISHERmES
REv., No. 3, at 40 (1966). For the Black Sea Fisheries, on the other hand, a joint
commission has been established by Bulgaria, Rumania and the U.S.S.R., but the
remaining coastal state, Turkey, has not yet joined.
'It can also be anticipated that certain kinds of regional decisions -will in-
fluence the making of later decisions at the world communal level. The diplomatic
decision-makers of any region also participate in the process of decision-making at
the world communal level. Men qualified to serve in administrative and arbitral
positions are called upon to play decision-making roles at all three levels of interna-
tional fishery organization. Almost all contemporary fishery experts at senior levels
have served most of their career in national governmental service. This training
pattern is not likely to change substantially through the efforts of the FAO to provide
technical and managerial training to developing countries, since these efforts are
directed mainly at present or future governmental employees.
It has been recently estimated that both Japan and the Soviet Union now have
over 3,000 deep sea fishing vessels. Brady, Focus on the Soviet Fleet, 4 FIsHING NEWS
It'L, No. 4 at 392 (1965). The growing capacity of other countries for extra-
regional fishing is evidenced by the construction of long-distance fleets of large
freezer trawlers in East Germany, West Germany, Poland and the United Kingdom.
Calculated by tonnage, Japan, Poland and Sweden lead in the construction and export
of fishing vessels. 28 Com. FISHERmS RaV., No. 3, 66 (1966). Several Mediterranean
fishing states, such as Greece, Italy and Egypt, are reported planning distant water
fleets. 5 FISHING NEWS INT'L, No. 4, 6 (1966). West Germany is now exploiting
distant and far distant Atlantic waters, off the Faroes, Greenland, Labrador, and
South Africa. Id. at 11. This trend towards more distant fishing by highly in-
dustralized fishing states could be documented at length.
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ticipants regardless of their geographical location; otherwise the en-
tire system might prove unworkable. Political pressure to curtail the
activities of these expansionist extraregional fishing states may be in-
evitable in some regions, but this should make it all the more desirable
that the extraregional claimants have access along with the intra-
regional claimants to the regional process of decision-making. The first
concern of the regional scheme should be the most rational develop-
ment of the region's resources, rather than the economic advancement
of the intraregional fishing states. 6 Regional fishery policies discrim-
inating against extraregional exploiters would violate the "general in-
terest" principle of internationalization and would probably involve
restrictions on the principle of resource development. The privileges
obtainable under the principle of special interest should exist indepen-
dently of the problem of extraregional users, and only considerations of
stock impairment should limit the degree of development.
It should be observed that these recommendations are consistent
with current developments in the allocation of international fishery
authority. Admittedly, many of the developments in international
cooperation affecting fishery development and conservation are limited
to the organization of scientific inquiry, but it is generally anticipated
that the results of scientific effort will provide the rationale for some
kind of conservation program, whether it is to be managed jointly by
the states themselves or by the neutral staff of an international com-
mission with regulatory powers. The best illustration of these develop-
ments is in the North Atlantic. In the late 1930's several scientists
supported a projected international scheme of fishery authority with
'The danger of discrimination against extraregional users will be reduced if all
users and intraregional nonusers with an interest in maintaining the region's fish-
ery resources can agree on giving proper weight to the consideration of resource
capacity. Economic regionalism would not represent much of an improvement upon
economic nationalism. One method of combatting both is the international fishing
venture where foreign capital and expertise are combined with domestic labor and
shore facilities to mutual advantage. According to the 1966 report of the Japanese
Fisheries Agency, Japanese fishing interests have invested over $6.4 million in
overseas fishing ventures representing 32 corporations in 28 different countries.
6 FISHING NEws INT'L, No. 2, at 12 (1967). Most of these overseas fishing ventures
are financed jointly, half by a private Japanese firm and half by the host country. The
firm provides technical guidance and training for fishermen of the host country and
usually provides masters for the vessels as well. The base usually includes a proces-
sing plant for freezing the fish which frequently packages the product for export.
With the entry of Japanese vessels into the Northwest Atlantic fishing grounds and a
continuing labor shortage in Japan, it is likely that more servicing bases will be
established in the region on the joint venture basis. CHRISTY & SCOTT 121. Ventures
of this kind might not be easily undertaken by fishing enterprises of socialist econo-
mies, such as that of the Soviet Union, but the Japanese success may encourage similar
distant fishing enterprises by countries such as Britain, \West Germany, and possibly
Poland, which has private and cooperative, as well as state, fishing enterprises.
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jurisdiction over the entire North Atlantic, but as it proved diplomati-
cally impossible to accomplish this kind of "Atlantic Alliance," the
North Atlantic was split into two conservation regions at the request
of the United States, with the Overfishing Convention of 1946 con-
fining itself to the area east of longitude 42°W., 7 and the Interna-
tional Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries of 1949 as-
suming jurisdiction in the area to the west.5" In the last few years,
however, the trend towards very close cooperation throughout the en-
tire North Atlantic has accelerated, partly because of the discovery
that salmon from both American and European rivers contribute to
the Atlantic salmon fishery off west Greenland, close to the jurisdic-
tional dividing line between the Northwest and Northeast Atlantic. 9
Moreover, when the United Kingdom convened the Northeast Atlantic
Fisheries (Policing) Conference in 1965, invitations were sent to the
United States, Canada and Japan, as well as to 14 European fishing
states;60 and the 1966 International Convention for Conservation of
Atlantic Tuna was sponsored by the FAQ. 61 It is significant, in the
'This convention, often referred to as the North Sea Convention of 1946 or,
more properly, the Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and
the Size Limits of Fish, April 1946, U.N.T.S. No. 3221, vol. 231, at 199, applied to
the area east of a line down the eastern side of the lower tip of Greenland as far east
as long. 36°E. in the Barents Sea and as far south at lat. 48N. opposite the coast of
Brittany. Growing dissatisfaction with the limitations of this convention brought 14
states together in 1959 for the conclusion of the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Conven-
tion, Jan. 24, 1956, U.N.T.S. No. 7078, vol. 486, at 157, whereby an International Fish-
eries Commission (NEAFC) was established to make specific conservation recommen-
dations for a much larger area of waters stretching as far east as long. 51E.
Barents Sea to as far south as lat. 36°N. opposite the Strait of Gibralter, though still
excluding the Baltic and the Mediterranean. The 1959 convention came into effect in
1963 thus abrogating its predecessor signed in 1946, except for a few specified provi-
sions which were to be regarded as "recommendations" under the 1959 convention.
' The area of ICNAF, to the west of long. 42°W. stretches from lat. 39°N., south
of Rhode Island as far north as lat. 780 10'N. off the west coast of Greenland. See
Engholm, Fishery Conservation in the Atlantic Ocean in ATLANnC OCEAN FISHERIS
(Borgstrom & Heighway eds. 1961).
It appears important to determine what proportion, if any, of these salmon
return to the rivers of Europe and North America. Revitalized under a new consti-
tution as the scientific adviser to NEAFC, the ICES expressed intense interest in
the salmon research program proposed by ICNAF at its meeting in June 1965. Ap-
proval was given by the ICES to the establishment of a joint ICNAF-ICES Work-
ing Party on Atlantic Salmon to supervise studies to determine the potential yield of
salmon stocks in both continents, and it was recommended that ICNAF and ICES
groups should explore the possibility of preparing a list of fishing craft operating in
the North Atlantic. 28 Com. Fisuamas REv., No. 1, at 61 (1966).
' Since the Soviet Union was one of the European states invited to the con-
ference, all four of the North Pacific fishing states have been participating in the
discussion of problems existing in the Northeast Atlantic-a remarkable demonstra-
tion of the degree of international cooperation and inter-regional consultation now
developing in world fishing, especially among the advanced fishing states.
" The draft convention was prepared in July 1965 at an FAO working party ses-
sion and opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro on May 14, 1966, when 17 nations
expressed their approval. This new convention will set up an international commis-
sion and permanent staff not only to deal with research but also to make conservation
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one case, that Canada and the United States do not fish in the North-
east Atlantic and that Japan does not even "belong" to the Atlantic
region; and in the other case, that the conservation of Atlantic tuna
was initiated at the world community level and that three of the ex-
ploiters-Japan, South Korea and Taiwan-are non-Atlantic states.12
These developments in the Atlantic raise the question whether the
perspective to be adopted should be limited to that of the North
Atlantic, or extended to the entire Atlantic Ocean. Scientific, diplo-
matic and administrative attitudes do not coincide. Marine ecologists
are likely to have the broadest viewpoint of all; and presumably dip-
lomats, at the other end of the scale, are the most likely to shrink
from participation in a regional scheme covering the entire Atlantic
Ocean. Difficult policy and administrative problems are inevitable in
a regional scheme shared by a vast number of fishing states, represent-
ing varying degrees of technological and economic advancement. Het-
erogeneity among the exploiters of the Atlantic tuna would not cause
too much difficulty if the Commission were devoted mainly to the col-
lection of scientific data. It will be interesting to see whether its mem-
bers will be able to agree on the measures necessary for the conservation
of the far-ranging species.
recommendations based on scientific findings. As in the case of ICNAF, panels will
be set up on the basis of species, groups of species, or of geographic areas. Covering
the whole Atlantic Ocean and adjacent waters such as the Caribbean, the Gulf of
Mexico and the Mediterranean, the convention directs the commission to work in
close co-operation with the FAO. It is open to all member nations of the United
Nations and its specialized agencies. 27 Co-t. FISHERIES REV., No. 9, at 52 (1965) ;
28 Id. No. 7, at 57 (1966). The Convention will come into force on the deposit of the
seventh instrument of ratification. At the time of writing the Convention had been
signed by Brazil, Spain, South Korea, United States, Japan, and Italy.
"'Much of the tuna fishing activity by distant fishing states has been concentrated
in the Southeast Atlantic, far beyond the territorial limits of South and Southwest
Africa. But the increasing volume of these "foreign intrusions" has caused resent-
ment in Southwest Africa in the adjacent coastal states and induced fears of over-
fishing. 28 Com. FISHERIES REv., No. 3, at 67-68 (1966). Resentment is increased by
foreign participation in the neighboring pilchard and anchovy fishery which now
yields more than one million tons annually, mostly for reduction into fish meal and
oil.
Most of the vessels flying the flags of Ghana and Poland off Southwest Africa have
been leased out by the Soviet Union and are manned in many cases by Russian crews.
Article 5(1) of the Convention on the High Seas requires that a "genuine link" exist
between a vessel and the flag state, and in particular that "that State must effectively
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters
over ships flying its flag." It is interesting to speculate that fishery regulations
might be evaded in the future through the use of "flags of convenience." See CHRISTY
& SCOTT 171-72, n.38.
A tuna fishery has not yet developed in the Northwest Atlantic, but exploration of
the oceanic region adjacent to the continental shelf of North America indicates com-
mercially significant populations of bluefin tuna in winter and spring and of yellow-
fin tuna in summer and early fall. Squire, Distribution of Tunas in Oceanic Waters
of the Northwestern Atlantic, 62 FISHERIES BULL., No. 211 (1962).
' Carroz & Roche, supra note 48, at 685-86.
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It is conceivable that as additional scientific data is procured, in the
Atlantic and elsewhere, subregional schemes will tend to proliferate, so
that the "conservation unit" can be kept as specific and controllable
as possible. 4 This might seem to suggest that managerial decision-
makers, confronted with day-by-day administrative problems, will
function more effectively at the subregional level, whereas arbitral
decision-makers, faced with the tasks of policy synthesis and recon-
ciliation, will gain most from the regional perspective. The situation
might be more complicated in underdeveloped fishing regions, where
most of the initiative in sponsoring international research and con-
servation programs is taken on the world community level by the
Fisheries Department of the FAO, although even under its current
expansion program that body has expressed reluctance to add to its
present limited roles. 5 Certainly, as more stocks in the same region
come under specific management, there will be increased need to recon-
cile these programs above the subregional level.
2. Summary and Appraisal. Due to unresolved complexities and
wide diversities in the exploitation and conservation of fishery re-
sources, there is a strong case for limiting the number of world com-
munal prescriptions to the six described above and for seeking new,
nondoctrinal solutions to fishery problems through the provision of
"Scientists have difficulty in defining a basic unit for conservation purposes.
A "population" of organisms has been described as "a homogeneous group of members
of the same species, which interbreed freely among themselves and which occupy a
continuous environment and so are able freely to intermix and thus maintain their
homogeneity." Schaefer, The Scientific Basis for a Conservation Program, in
PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL TEcHNICAL CONFERENCE ON THE CON-
SERVATION OF THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SEA 20 (1965). A "stock" has been dehned
in similar terms: "a single interbreeding and intermingling unit of one species of
fish." Royce, Concepts and Practices in the Conservation of Fishery Resources, in
THE FISHERIES: PROBLEMS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 7, 17 (Crutchfield ed. 1965).
It might be questioned, however, whether the extent of a regional scheme's con-
servation authority should be limited to that of the protected population or stock.
Whether a scheme is concerned with regulatory measures or only with scientific
inquiries, it will be interested in encouraging investigations into the biotic and
abiotic factors beyond the stock's own environment so as to discover more about the
ecological processes in the entire, hypothetically effective marine environment. Re-
search of this kind may be expected to continue indefinitely, and the limitations of a
stock-based subregional scheme may be eliminated through the co-ordination of its
policies with those of other schemes in the region.
'The following appears in Jackson, FAO Fisheries: Next Big Step, 5 FISHING
NEWS INT'L No. 2, at 268 (1966):
The fuller status of a Department of Fisheries and the improved framework
contemplated will enable us to deal on a more equal basis with the increasing
number of regional international fishery bodies who have, and will continue to
have, the ultimate responsibility and authority for regulating international
fisheries. FAO's role is that of a service organization providing information
and technical assistance and promoting that cooperation which is essential in
ocean fisheries and in many instances, in freshwater fisheries as well.
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institutional perspectives and procedures on regional and subregional
levels of organization. Since bilateral arrangements tend to be based on
accommodation between two sets of national interests rather than on
one set of impartial principles, preference should be given to the adop-
tion of a full regional perspective by a centralized organization for the
regional implementation of world community principles of fishery
authority. As a precise formulation of conservation policy on the
world community level proves unrealistic, regional schemes of fishery
authority will inherit the task of supplementing the world community
principle with policies based on the needs and opportunities of each
region. Regional schemes should be open to all interested parties
within the region and to all extraregional users. The development of
several loci of decision-making seems bound to involve some new cri-
teria of policy, as well as new procedures, since such a development is
necessitated mainly by the unworkability of detailed or uniform con-
servation prescriptions on the world community level. It rests on the
decision-makers for each region to ensure that their regional policies
do nothing to diminish the flow of trade and economic and technical
assistance from countries outside the region.
II. THE NORTH PACIFIC REGION
A. The Case for a Split-level System of Authority
It is probably sufficient for most purposes to consider the North
Pacific as stretching north of the Tropic of Cancer, bounded on one
side by the western coast of North America and on the other by the
landmass of East Asia. For some fishery purposes it is normal to
define the North Pacific more narrowly, 66 but by almost any definition
the North Pacific fisheries have been exploited chiefly by four states:
Canada, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Therefore, it
is true to say that all four of the chief user States of the North Pacific
fishery resources are resident States of the North Pacific region.
But the prospects for North Pacific fishery authority are enhanced
by advantages other than the mere absence at present of an "extra-
regional problem." All four States bordering the region enjoy a rela-
tively high standard of living sustained by massive industrialized
economies. Large funds of capital, technological skills and scientific
knowledge are available, if not actually used, for investment in modem
'The area designated as "North Pacific" for statistical purposes by the FAO
seems to be the area lying to the north of approximately lat. 40'N., just south of Hok-
kaido Island at one end and close to San Francisco at the other.
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fishing fleets, ancillary services67 and in hydrographic studies of all
kinds. All four States are among the leading fishing States and the
North Pacific is one of the world's major fishing regions.6 8 Their so-
cieties feature stable governments and high standards of literacy and
education. Between Canada and the United States, in particular, the
sharing of language and similar culture, values and institutions, pro-
vides closely similar perspectives on many kinds of problems. All
four States have contributed to international arrangements affecting
the exploitation of the resources of the North Pacific.' 9
Not only are few user states involved in North Pacific fishing, but
relatively few species have been intensively exploited. Accordingly,
the vast sums of money and great scientific diligence expended by all
four States on valuable species such as the salmon, halibut, and crab
have resulted in the accumulation of impressive scientific data as a
basis for national and international conservation programs. Super-
Compared with the Soviet Union and Japan, and to a lesser extent Canada, the
United States has scarcely begun to apply its great technological ability to the catch-
ing and processing of fish. The American fishing industry has been almost stagnant
since 1950 and has not grown much since the late 1920's. "At the present time there
is not a single trawler operating in the United States that would be considered to be
a modern practical vessel in Japan, Russia, Iceland, England, Germany or Poland."
Chapman, U.S. Assists World Fisheries While Home Industry Declines, in 2
Fs ING GAzETte, No. 2, at 12-28 (1965).
In 1964, Japan had the second largest total catch (6.33 million metric (m.m.)
tons, representing 12.3% of the world total catch) the U.S.S.R. had the fourth largest
(4.48 m.m. tons and 8.7%); the United States was in fifth place (2.64 m.m. tons and
5.1%) ; and Canada was ninth (1.21 nm. tons and 2.3%). In 1965 Japan, the USSR
and the United States kept their places, and though Canada dropped to tenth position
its catch was greater than in 1964.
Of the 1964 total world catch of 51.6 m.m. tons (live weight) the Pacific Ocean and
adjacent waters contributed 25.6 m.n. tons (49%), the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent
waters 18.1 rm.r tons (35%), and the Indian Ocean and adjacent waters 1.8 m.m. tons
(4%). The North Pacific region produced 4.8 m.m. tons (9% of world catch), the
Western Central Pacific 9.9 nm. tons (19%), and the Eastern Central Pacific 0.5
m.m. tons (1%). But the most productive of all Pacific regions is the Southeastern
which in 1964 yielded 10.3 n.m. tons (20%) mostly from the new and bountiful ancho-
veta fishery which has made the Peruvian catch the largest national catch in the world.
In 1965 Peru remained in first place though its production fell from 9.1 m.m. tons in
1964 to 7.5 m.m. tons. (The anchovetas, which are mostly reduced to fish meal and fish
oil, are vital in sustaining the guano birds which supported the famous fertilizer indus-
try. Several years ago the bottom fell out of the world market for this natural
fertilizer.)
On the basis of average production for the period 1957-59 the 1964 Pacific catch
represented an increase of 88%, but this figure is inflated by the 602% increase in the
Southeastern region I The average increase of over 26% for the North, Western Cen-
tral and Eastern Central Pacific regions is just under the figure for the Atlantic
Ocean as a whole. But in 1964 the North Pacific contributed 381,000 metric tons of
salmon (chinooks, chums, cohoes, pinks and sockeyes), compared with only 13,000
metric tons of Atlantic salmon (which includes trouts and chars) and in the same
year the North Pacific produced 197,000 metric tons of crabs compared with 88,000
metric tons elsewhere. FAO, 1964 FISHERY STATISTICS (1964); 6 FISHING NEws
INT'L, No. 3, at 16-18 (1967).
' On the history of international co-operation and organization affecting the
North Pacific fisheries, see JoHNsToiT 264-82, 370-96.
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ficially, at least, it would seem that the North Pacific is a favorable
arena for advances in regional fishery authority.
On the other hand, much of the apparent homogeneity is deceptive.
The Soviet Union and Japan have enormous fleets equipped in the most
modern fashion for long distance fishing,70 whereas Canada and the
United States depend more heavily on smaller craft designed for fishing
in waters closer to home.71 In the United States the fishing industry
is declining and fishery imports continue to rise every year,72 whereas
Canada shows an impressive rise in fishery exports.7 3 Japan fishes for
enormous markets both at home and abroad, 74 whereas most of the
70 The Russian fishing industry has undergone rapid expansion in recent years as
attention has turned from over-fished domestic waters to distant fisheries, with
marked increases in both the number and size of vessels. It is evident, despite the
lack of reliable data, that the rate and amount of Russian investment exceeds that of
any other fishing nation. CHRISTY & SCOTT 121-23; Armstrong, Soviet Sea Fisheries
Since the Second World War, 13 THE POLAR RECORD, No. 83, at 155 (1966). Japa-
nese investment in its huge fishing industry is reflected not in increased numbers of
vessels but in increased tonnage, power and size of vessels. CHRISTY & SCOTT 117-21.
Japan not only leads the world in the construction of fishing vessels but in ship build-
ing in general.
3' Less than 3% of all fishing vessels in the United States are over 100 gross tons.
In 1962 there were only 26 U.S. fishing vessels over 500 gross tons and these averaged
only about 1,000 tons each.
Investments in modern vessels and equipment have been on a relatively low level in
the United States, partly because the government is less directly involved in support-
ing fishing enterprises than governments of most other fishing states. CHRISTY &
ScoTT 123-24. The American fishery program is often contrasted unfavorably with
the Russian. See, e.g., Chapman, How Russia Develops Her Fisheries and Sea
Power, 4 FISHING NEws INT'L, No. 4, at 402 (1965).
Almost none of the Canadian Pacific catch is taken in deep sea waters and almost
two-thirds of the Canadian Atlantic fishing is still conducted within 15 miles of land
in small craft. The Canadian offshore Atlantic fleet has been expanding rapidly
since 1961 under a substantial federal subsidy program. CHRISTY & SCOTT 124-25.
In February 1966 the Canadian Atlantic Offshore Fishing Vessels Conference was
held in Montreal, under the auspices of the Federal-Provincial Atlantic Fisheries
Committee, to consider technical problems associated with these developments in the
Canadian fishing industry.
12 The United States is the world's largest importer of fishery products. In 1964
U.S. fishery imports were valued at $477,988,000. FAO, 1964 FISHERY STATISTICS
(1964).
' In 1964 the total Canadian catch exceeded $250 million in value, and more than
two-thirds of this ($184,071,000) went into exports. This makes Canada the second
greatest exporter of fishery products in the world. FAO, 1964 FISHERY STATISTICS
(1964); The Success of Canada's Quality Control Policy, 4 FISHING NEWS INT'L,
No. 4, 32 (1965). At the present rate of increase Canadian fishery exports in 1966
will have doubled in value since 1960. Canadian imports in 1964 were valued at
$20,454,000.
"Japan is the world's greatest exporter of fishery products. It has been estimated
that between 1954 and 1956, 73% of Japan's total protein intake was derived from fish,
and yet Japanese fishery exports in 1959 accounted for 14% of all Japanese exports in
that year. CHRISTY & SCOTT 115. The value of Japanese fishery exports in 1964 was
reported to be $247,862,000, compared with $69,861,000 of imports. FAO, 1964 FISHERY
STATISTICS (1964). But Japan is also the world's biggest consumer of fish, and con-
sumption is rising steadily. As domestic supply levels off, Japan is becoming one
of the world's leading importers of fishery products. In 1966 import volume had
jumped to U.S. $160 million.
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Soviet catch is consumed domestically. 5
But more significant than the different roles of the fishing industry
in the national economy of the four North Pacific States are the com-
plementary roles that the four national industries can play in the
region's development and trade. The demand for fishery products is
relatively inelastic in Canada and the United States, but North Pacific
fishery products could play an increasing role in the export trade with
other regions. 716 Indeed the entire North Pacific basin is certain to
become an economic unit of the first importance within a few decades,
especially if Communist China enters the international economy on a
significant scale. The mixing of legal systems in the North Pacific may
contribute new solutions to problems created by increasing interna-
tional cooperation and trade in that region. The inhibitive effects of
antagonistic ideologies seem to have diminished in recent years77 and
'The value of Russian fishery imports in 1964 was reported to be as low as
$27,794,000. FAO, 1964 FISHERY STATISTiCS (1964). It has been estimated that the
USSR exported only 99,000 metric tons worth U.S. $44 million. 28 Com. FISHEmmIS
REV., No. 4, 49 (1966). In a large-scale effort to boost protein intake in the Soviet
Union, high priority has been given to fisheries on the understanding that the re-
turns to capital and labor in fisheries far exceed those in animal husbandry. A Rus-
sian expert has calculated, for example, that the production of one head of beef re-
quires twenty man-days, while the production of an equivalent amount of protein
from fish would take only five man-days. CHRISTY & ScotT 40-41, 122-23.
" With modern advances in food technology, it seems that nonperishable fishery
products are capable of becoming a significant commodity in international trade.
The newer methods of preservation, such as quick freezing and irradiation, and not-
so-new methods such as canning, will compete increasingly with fresh fish and fish
cured by the older methods of drying, salting, smoking, pickling and fermenting. Many
questions remain to be tested: What impact will the "surplus" processed fish of the
"have" fishing states make on low-income Asian and African markets that tend to
favor fresh and cured fish? What is the real potentiality of fish protein concen-
trate (FPC) in the protein-hungry countries of the world? Can the Japanese model of
overseas joint fishing ventures be copied by enterprising firms and government
agencies in other countries? What are the limits of cooperation and competition
between the planning agencies of socialist economies and the entrepreneurs of capital-
ist economies?
In very high income economies, such as the American and Canadian, where
alternative protein foods are abundant and demand for fish is inelastic, consumer
interest in fish lies in the fact that it adds to the variety of fare. Demand for fish
may eventually take this form in Japan with its relatively high and rising income,
despite its tradition as a great fish-eating country. In the Soviet socialist economy
today demand for fish is kept at a relatively high level by setting the price at about
half that of meat. When projecting demand for fish, it should be remembered that the
sea provides a very wide variety of specific kinds of products and that these products
can be put to more than one use. In the United States the trend is toward fish use for
industrial purposes-for reduction to fish meal and oil-and increasing dependence on
imports to satisfy the demand for food fish.
In 1948, when the FAO began compiling fishery statistics, only 20% of the total
reported catch went into international trade; in 1958 the proportion had risen to 28%;
and in 1964 it had reached 41%o. The 1964 figures were based on the catches reported
by 145 countries, which represent an estimated 88% of the actual world catch. On the
basis of the average value for the 1957-59 period, international trade in the fishery
products of these 145 reporting countries in 1964 represented an increase of 129%.
'Apparently the Soviet Union still complains that American and Canadian im-
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a healthier kind of rivalry, albeit ideologically inspired, might prove
to be a stimulant to regional development and trade. With a long his-
tory of successes and some failures, the Northeast Pacific, if not the
entire Pacific basin, seems to be a suitable arena for experiment and
innovation.
The policies of the four North Pacific States on territorial and fish-
ery limits have differed somewhat in the past, but it is believed that
their present policies on the development of international fishery au-
thority are no longer irreconcilable. The differences in their claims
to territorial and exclusive fishing limits7" should not be exaggerated.
More significantly, the Soviet Union, as a fishing State, has proved to
be cooperative in schemes of international cooperation,7 9 and there is
now some evidence that the traditional Japanese policy of reluctance
and skepticism regarding restrictive conservation measures is under-
going serious re-evaluation both by the fishing industry and the gov-
perialists, through the imposition of the abstention provisions in the International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, May 9, 1952
[1953] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, have forced Japan to exploit "Rus-
sian" stocks of salmon in the Northwest Pacific. But this complaint, though colored
by ideological references, could have been made by any state in Russia's position.
'The Soviet Union has long claimed a 12-mile territorial sea. Canada now
claims 12 miles for fishing but retains the traditional 3-mile territorial limit. The
United States now claims a 9-mile zone contiguous to its territorial sea which it
still defines within the traditional 3-mile limit. Japan has long supported a 3-mile
territorial sea and has attacked claims to extensive fishing limits. This is consistent
with her interests as a distant fishing state . It seems now that this policy is in the
process of modification. In the 1965 arrangement with South Korea, Japan promised
to respect a 12 -mile fishing limit around the Korean coast and established several
exclusive fishing zones vis-a-vis Korea, such as that around the Japanese island of
Tsushima. The Japanese government insisted, however, that it did not at present
intend to establish 12-mile fishing limits along its entire coast; that the zones ex-
cluding Korean fishermen do not affect other countries; that unilaterally established
12-mile limits do not bind Japan; that the abortive attempts at Geneva in 1958 and
1960 to establish such limits universally are not declaratory of existing law; and that
consensual limits apply only to contracting parties. 27 CoM. FISHERIES REV., No. 12,
64-65 (1965). At the time of this writing Japan is sponsoring full-scale investiga-
tions with a view to reconsidering its position on territorial and exclusive fishing
limits.
"The Soviet Union is a member of a commission for investigating the resources
of the West Pacific (along with the People's Republics of China, Korea, Viet Nam
and Mongolia); the Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Commission in the Northwest Pacific;
of the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission; the International Commission for
the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; of the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission;
the International Whaling Commission; and is party to several other intergovern-
mental fishery arrangements. Mikhailov, International Law and the Regulation of
Fisheries and Other Maritime Industries in the Pacific, 1960 SOVIET YEARBOOK INT'L
L. 189. Russian scientists have participated fully in the international flow of data
and ideas. Armstrong, supra note 70, 175-77. In July 1965 Soviet king crab biologists
visited American fishing vessels and an exploratory vessel of the U.S. Bureau of
Commercial Fisheries to observe and participate in daily sampling work. 27 Com.
FISHERIES REV., No. 10, 21 (1965). American fishery experts praise the Russians
for their recent good record in international cooperation. See Chapman, supra note
71, at 402.
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ernment of Japan.s In some ways the least successful of the current
subregional schemes of fishery authority in the North Pacific, the
Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Commission, might be strengthened if a
regional perspective could be adopted."' The present diplomatic
agonies shared by Canada, Japan and the United States over the
renegotiation of the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention,
and especially over certain basic features such as the abstention prin-
ciple, would certainly become more meaningful, if the Soviet Union
could be admitted to the process of agonizing reappraisal. Admittedly,
there are advantages in continuing the present system of short-term,
bilateral agreements on the allocation of resources such as the king
crab off Alaska,"' both for the United States and the noncoastal states.
s' Because of Japan's global fishing interests, Japanese scientists have cooperated,
either as members or observers, with most of the world's regional and subregional
schemes of authority, and have been particularly helpful in contributing to the fund of
scientific knowledge of the seas. The political pressure of the powerful fishing and
whaling interests in Japan has traditionally forced the Japanese government to take
a negative attitude towards restrictive conservation measures. But at recent meetings
sponsored by the Japan Fishery Resource Conservation Association several Japanese
scientists expressed the view that the Japanese government's present policy on distant-
water fisheries could not cope with changes in these fisheries which developed rapidly
after World War II and have subsequently undergone tremendous structural changes.
They stressed the need to re-examine and clarify policies for these fisheries from a
fresh and different point of view, and indicated that these views were shared by some
members of the government and by some sections of the fishing industry. 28 Com.
FisHEms REv., No. 1, 86 (1966). In January 1966, after consultation with the tuna
industry, the Japanese government released a report entitled Assessment of the Current
Tuna Fishery and Direction of Counter-measures. It pointed out that movements were
under way to set up international regulations over tuna fisheries in the East Pacific and
Atlantic Oceans, based on scientific research, and anticipated that regulations might be
extended to other areas. In the expectation that a worldwide increase in fishing inten-
sity will continue unless international restrictions are imposed to manage the resources,
the report stated that "Japan should positively assume the position of leadership in the
movements aimed at international management of the resources." Id. No. 4, at 61(1966). On its face, this report seems to signal an important change in Japanese fishery
policy both inside and outside the North Pacific basin.
' On the practices and shortcomings of this commission, see ODA, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF SEA REsouRcEs 72-76, (1963) ; see also JoHNSTON 391-96. Japan and the
Soviet Union are currently renegotiating the Northwest Pacific Fisheries Conven-
tion of 1956. The chief issues are the division of the salmon catch and the status of
the king crab fishery in the Northwest Pacific. Some progress towards joint con-
servation policy might be expected as a result of the Soviet-Japanese Agreement for
Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Fisheries signed in 1966. 28 Com. FisH-
EmIls REv., No. 9, 36 (1966). But the Soviet Union purports to be concerned about
South Korea, whose expanding fishing fleet is extending its activities into the con-
vention waters. 29 Com. FisaERmEs REv., No. 3, 13-14 (1967). It should be noted,
however, that the "newcomer problem" posed by South Korean expansion seems to
come within the scope of the recently created Japan-ROK Joint Fisheries Commis-
sion which is to undertake scientific surveys of fishery resources in "sea areas of
common interest." Oda, The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the
Republic of Korea, 61 AimE. J. INT'L LAw 35, 53 (1967).
'On Dec. 14, 1964, the Soviet Union agreed to keep Russian fishermen out of six
areas off Kodiak where American crab fishermen bad long operated. This agreement
expires at the end of 1967. On Feb. 5, 1965, the Soviet Union recognized the king
crab as a creature of the Continental Shelf over which the coastal state has a
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But a large-scale regional scheme of authority covering the North
Pacific operating under world community prescriptions to establish a
balance between the special interest of the coastal state and the general
interest of noncoastal regional and extraregional users of the region's
resources should be adopted. The adoption of a regional point of view
by all four States, over the same bargaining table, would produce new
lines of thought helpful to the administrators of the subregional
schemes as well as to those involved in national economic planning.
B. Some Problems of Regional Planning
The proposal for a regional scheme of authority shared by the four
North Pacific States suggests a variety of problems. In this paper it
is possible only to comment on a few of the more obvious problems
confronting the policy-makers on the diplomatic level and to suggest
the limits within which solutions might be found for these problems.
More difficult decisions will have to be taken after expert feasibility
studies have been made from scientific, economic, technological, and
administrative points of view.
1. Scope of Authority. For scientific and administrative reasons, it
seems best to define the scope of an area-based scheme of authority
for the whole North Pacific region according to the maximum physical
and ecological limits of the resources under the jurisdiction of the
existing stock-based and subregional schemes. By this criterion, if the
Northwest is to be included, the scheme would assume authority over
a vast area stretching from the North American coast in the east to the
Sea of Japan in the west, and from the Bering Strait" in the north as
far south as the 30th parallel of north latitude."4 It should be noted
sovereign right and agreed to limit its catch to 118,600 cases a year in 1965 and 1966.
This agreement was extended for two more years on Feb. 13, 1967, with the Soviet
catch limit reduced to 100,000 cases a year for 1967 and 1968. Japan has not yet
adopted the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, but on Nov. 25, 1964, she
agreed with the United States that the Japanese crab catch off Alaska should be lim-
ited to 185,000 cases a year in 1965 and 1966. In November 1966 this king crab agree-
ment was renewed for two more years and the Japanese catch limit was reduced to
163,000 cases for 1967 and 1968.
' Recent Russian investigations suggest that the wealth of the Bering Sea is
much greater than previously supposed. 5 FISHING NEws INT'L, No. 2, 80 (1966).
' The Japan-Soviet Convention for the Northwest Pacific Fisheries covers the
whole of the Northwest Pacific waters, including the Sea of Japan, and the Sea of
Okhotsk and the Bering Sea, but excludes territorial waters. In 1962 Japan and the
Soviet Union agreed to establish two areas. Area A, representing the original
treaty waters, included the area to the north of lat. 45°N. Still excluded are the Rus-
sian coastal and fresh water salmon fisheries which have a close ecological connection
with the high seas salmon fishery covered by the convention.
The fur seal arrangements in the North Pacific since 1911 have prohibited pelagic
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that this recommended area lies further south than the area designated
as North Pacific in the FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics;8 5 that it
would include part of the territorial waters in the region;86 and that
the suggested southernmost limit is chosen rather arbitrarily to coin-
cide with the southernmost limit of the area within which pelagic seal-
ing is prohibited by agreement of the four North Pacific fishing States.
Whether this area is sufficiently extensive as a conservation region-
comparable with the two conservation regions in the North Atlantic-
can be judged only after continued scientific investigation of the re-
gion.8
7
It can be argued that diplomatic decision-makers confronted with
the task of determining the scope of the regional scheme are likely to
be more influenced by nonscientific factors. It may be only a matter of
time before the expanding fleets of developing "have-not" countries,
such as South Korea, Taiwan, and perhaps Communist China, extend
their activities into the most economically attractive fishing grounds
within the scheme's jurisdiction."8 To this the best answer seems to be
that it rests upon the member states of the regional scheme to make the
benefits of cooperation with the regional scheme so attractive that
participation in regional and subregional conservation programs will
sealing absolutely in an extensive area north of the 30th parallel of north latitude of
the Pacific Ocean, including the Seas of Bering, Okhotsk and Japan (but apparently
excluding the Sea of Kamchatka since 1957).
' See note 66 supra. The recommended area overlaps the regions designated by
the FAO as western-central and eastern-central.
saThe Japanese-Soviet Convention and the International Convention for the High
Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean expressly exclude territorial waters,
whereas the International Pacific Halibut Commission and the International Pacific
Salmon Fisheries Commission are expressly authorized to exercise conservation
authority over the species in territorial as well as high seas areas.
' Since the fur seal and salmon form a predator-prey relationship in the North
Pacific, it is important to take note of current investigations into the distribution of
North Pacific salmon stocks of both Asian and North American origin, under the
auspices of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission. It is relevant,
for example, that immature Bristol Bay sockeye salmon have been shown to migrate
as far west as long. 173°E., beyond the Aleutian chain of islands, and long. 170°E.,
north of the Commander (Komandorskie) Islands in the Bering Sea. Maturing
Kamchatka sockeye salmon have been tagged as far east as long. 165°E., and maturing
Bristol Bay sockeye as far west as long. 167°E. Cleaver, Origins of High Seas Sock-
eye Salmon, in 63 FiSHERY BULL. OF U.S. FIsH AND WILD LiFE SERv. 2, 445, 473-74
(1964).
' The expanding fleets of Korea and Taiwan are already providing the Japanese
tuna catchers with serious competition in the Sea of Japan and it is likely that they
will be required to agree on common conservation measures. See note 81 supra. In
December 1965 the fishery enterprises of Japan and Communist China extended their
private agreement for two years. By this nongovernmental agreement a limited
number of Japanese fishermen are allowed to fish in six designated zones near the
Chinese mainland, and provision is made for the tightening of regulations on mesh
sizes, minimum fish sizes, and catch composition. 28 Com. FISHERIES REv. No. 3, 60
(1966).
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be regarded as desirable by newcomers. With rapid progress in the
detection of fish and rather less rapid progress in long-range forecast-
ing of changes in the ocean, it seems likely that the availability of fish-
ery intelligence services will provide an important inducement to de-
veloping fishing industries to conform with organized conservation
practices.89 In any event, it might be anticipated that in the gradual
evolution of a North Pacific scheme of authority it will become com-
monly desirable to extend the scheme's jurisdiction to include waters
further to the west and those states that exploit the stocks in those
areas.
Because of the predator-prey relationship between the fur seal and
the North Pacific salmon, it is obviously essential that the activities of
all four parties to the Interim Convention on the Conservation of the
North Pacific Fur Seals and of the North Pacific Fur Seal Commission
should be brought within the split-level system of authorities envisaged
for the region.9° Moreover, just as it was regarded as vital to protect
the existing conservation programs over the salmon and halibut stocks
shared by Canada and the United States, when the International Con-
vention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean was
negotiated in 1953,"' it would be essential to form a mutually suitable
relationship between the projected regional scheme and the existing
subregional salmon and halibut commissions. With a broader per-
spective, and the enthusiastic participation of the Soviet Union, there
is surely a reasonable expectation that the range of possible solutions
to this difficult problem would be extended.
2. Identification of Interest. It is supposed that diplomatic negotia-
tors of an area-based scheme of fishery authority for the entire North
Pacific region would find the advice of the administrators of existing
'The regional scheme, with direct access to all new scientific data acquired
within its jurisdiction, might withhold certain data of direct and immediate com-
mercial significance from uncooperative newcomers, so as to give a distinct advan-
tage in locating the best fishing grounds to the cooperative fleets. The regional
scheme's policing procedures would, in any event, have to take cognizance of unfair
practices by uncooperative states which might include "spying" on the movements of
better-informed vessels of cooperative states. The prospect of disputes over the
applicability of policing procedures to nonparty states would, hopefully, tend to en-
courage the latter to participate in, or cooperate with, the regional scheme. Once the
scientific data have ceased to have an immediate commercial value for uncooperative
fleets, they should of course be made available to the scientific world.
' See note 87 supra.
"This vital interest in preserving the salmon and halibut conservation pro-
grams led to the controversial abstention provisions, and it is the same interest
which has caused the most acute problems during the current efforts to renegotiate
the treaty at Japan's request. See JOHNSTON 275-82.
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conservation programs invaluable in helping them to establish the
framework for tolerable relationships between the existing subregional
schemes and the projected regional scheme. Within a split-level sys-
tem of fishery authority the managers of any one subregional scheme
would have less reason than at present to defend the "interests" of
their own species against those of others,92 and presumably those sec-
tions of a national fishing industry associated with a particular species
or area of waters can be trusted to represent themselves either before
their own government or, in collaboration with their counterparts in
other interested states, before the institutions of the regional scheme
itself. The latter alternative might prove to be more effective if the
intergovernmental scheme is functioning as a genuine regional unit,
especially since managerial and arbitral, as well as diplomatic, com-
promises might be obtainable on this regional level. Here, as in other
situations, nongovernmental claimants would remain free to calculate
the relative effectiveness of "administrative," "equitable," and "politi-
cal" arguments advanced before managerial, arbitral and diplomatic
decision-makers.
The chief responsibility of the regional scheme will be to find an
economical and equitable balance between the general interest of the
region and the special interests of the four (or more) parties. It should
not be difficult for Canada and the United States to accept special
interests of Japan and the Soviet Union in western areas of the region,
since the North American fleets do not participate in distant fishing
there, and have expressed no aspiration to do so. The Soviet Union
has not contested Canadian and American special interests within 12
miles of their coasts and Japan is now expected to soften her opposi-
tion at the bargaining table.93 Hopefully, some of the difficulties en-
countered by Japan and the Soviet Union in their annual negotiations
over national quotas would be eased by providing for a regional per-
" Presumably, scientific-administrative loyalties to a particular species or area
could be redirected more easily if they were allotted a more specific role in a general
scheme for the most rational use of the resources of the entire region.
In February 1967 the Soviet Union accepted the recently claimed American nine-
mile fishing zone continguous to the territorial sea of the United States and in
return was granted the right to conduct fishing and loading operations at several
points within the zone off Alaska, Washington and Oregon. At the time of this
writing Japanese negotiators are claiming the privileges of a state whose fishermen
have conducted "traditional fishing" within the zone. See Bowkett, U.S. Steps Up
Fishing Rights Vigil Off Alaska, The Christian Science Monitor, May 11, 1967,
p. 1, col. 1-5, p. 17 col. 1-8. Despite their rejection of Japanese claims of "historic"
privilege applied to Alaska-bound salmon in Bristol Bay, Americans have themselves
frequently invoked privilege based on traditional fishing in their disputes with
Canada. American interception of Canadian-bound salmon is a current issue between
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spective on the potentialities and relative importance of the resources
which they share.
3. Objectives of Fishery Use. The unwisdom of spelling out con-
servation objectives in world communal prescriptions has already been
suggested, and the difficult problems involved in the formulation of
conservation objectives for the North Pacific are dealt with in another
paper in this symposium.94 The objectives set out in existing North
Pacific schemes have been formulated in biological terms, " and the
economic shortcomings of these programs are well documented. The
task of formulating conservation objectives in socio-economic terms,
on the other hand, would be more difficult,"1 and it is not easy to see
how they could be made workable in a region such as the North
Pacific. It might be suggested, however, that diplomatic policy-
the two North American states, with Canada objecting to the present 50-50 quota
arrangement for the Fraser River salmon fishery and questioning the adequacy of the
provisions of the 1956 Pink Salmon Protocol which brings that species within the
responsibility of the bilateral International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission.
5 FISHING NEWS INT'L, No. 7, at 60 (1966); Id. No. 6, at 50 (1966).
" See generally, Burke, supra note 48, at 145, where the author treats the objectives
of fishery commissions, including those of the North Pacific.
'See the Preamble to the 1953 International Convention for the High Seas
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean May 9, 1952 [1953] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 380,
T.I.A.S. No. 2786; Preamble to and art. 2(1) (a) of the 1957 Interim Convention on the
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals Feb. 9, 1957 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2283, T.I.A.S.
No. 3948; and art. 3(2) of the 1937 Northern Pacific Halibut Fishery Convention
L.N.T.S. 4190, vol. CLXXXI, p. 209.
" See note 45 supra. For a recent criticism, see Crutchfield, Economic Objectives
of Fishery Management, in THE FISHERIES: PROBLEMS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMIENT
43-63 (Crutchfield ed. 1965). Crutchfield regards conservation as "essentially an in-
vestment decision." He asks, id. at 55:
Is it wiser to take some now and "invest" in the productive capacity of the
fisheries stock itself? ... What is confusing in the case of a fish population or a
forest is that the inventory of final products and the factory are one and the same
thing; the problem is to find an optimal balance between a fishery stock viewed
as a source of consumer goods and the same fishery stock viewed as a piece of
productive equipment. In either usage it is essential that the largest net benefit
from both investment and consumption be obtained.
See also JOHNSTO N 49-55, 67-68, 380-84.
For example, it may be considered necessary to take account of "opportunity
cost." Crutchfield, supra note 96 at 55 states:
Society's interest lies in conserving not only natural resources but the labor
and capital necessary to utilize them. If fishing effort is pushed beyond the point
where the margin of receipts over costs is greatest, more fish are produced, but
only by giving up other products, the value of which is greater than the value of
the additional fish .... The vital problem is how to achieve an optimal balance in
the use of all resources, human and physical.
The following appears in CHRISTY & ScoTT at 74:
[I]n cases where the fishermen from different nations are fishing for ecologi-
cally related species, it becomes difficult to define a maximum net economic
revenue for the region's fisheries. In some ways this is a familiar problem in
cases where the multiple use of a common resource base is attempted. But in
other ways the problem is unique, because instead of dealing with a single
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makers in the four North Pacific States should envisage the future uses
of the region's fishery resources as part of a larger effort to develop
intraregional and interregional trade. There is little doubt that current
rapid advances in fishery and food technology will soon make the
living resources of the sea an important commodity in the world
market, and it is certain that the four North Pacific States can take
a leading part in this development. If clearer perceptions of a North
Pacific trade pattern can be acquired, fishery conservation objectives
in the region might be expected to come into focus.99
At the same time, it is hoped that all four States are capable of ac-
cepting certain responsibilities for assisting developing countries, if not
in the spirit of altruism, then with the intelligence of enlightened self-
interest. The advantages which all four North Pacific States enjoy
may be best secured by sharing them with less favored nations through
trade privileges and technical assistance.100
4. Dispute-settling Procedures. The drafters of the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas
took a limited view of the kinds of fishery disputes for which world
community settlement procedures should be established. It seems that
they have limited themselves to disputes over the exercise of national
or international authority for the implementation of stock-based con-
servation programs, and that they have failed to consider the range
of disputes that might arise through the management of area-based
programs.' Certainly, they have expressly addressed themselves only
uniform wage-price structure, it involves a variety of wage-price structures.
Different prices, or values, may be placed upon the same commodity and different
costs applied to the same input. These differences may not be difficult to
reconcile where the economies involved are similar, but they may be almost
insuperable where such diverse economies as the Soviet, the Japanese, and those
of the West may be focusing their efforts on the same species or on different
but related species in the same region.
But the differences between the Soviet fishing industry and the private enterprise
fishing industries of the other three states may not be as great as usually supposed.
Armstrong, supra note 70, at 177-83.
' It is common for fish to be a part of several transnational transactions before it
reaches the consumer's plate. Off West Africa some 90 Japanese vessels catch tuna in
the Equatorial Current. The tuna are transferred to West German freighters, brought
to Puerto Rico for canning, sailed to the United States, tracked for instance to
Cape Cod, Mass., where they sell cheaper than the tuna caught 5 miles away. Hahn,
The Adventure of Oceanography, 5 FISHING NEws INT'L, No. 4, at 24 (1966).
'
0 It has been argued elsewhere that the United States should start applying its
technology to fisheries not for its own sake but for the sake of aiding developing
countries. See e.g., id. at 25.
" In criticizing the Convention, Christy and Scott state that "it envisages
treaties based on stocks of fish rather than on regions, thus giving little encourage-
ment to arrangements that might change the dominant stock of a certain region."
CHRisTY & Scon 173-74.
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to claims contesting the need for conservation measures in general, to
the scientific validity of specific measures, and to claims alleging that
the measures constitute unfair discrimination.
These three types of disputes might be regarded as examples of dis-
putes over conservation authority that lend themselves to settlement
by arbitral decision-makers. Almost every conceivable fishery dispute
will be regional in origin, and it seems desirable, on principle, that in
the initial phase of settlement the variable factors peculiar to the use
of the region's resources should be brought into light to clarify regional
fishery policy. If regional dispute-settling procedures and policy clar-
ifications are not sufficiently creative to settle the dispute amicably,
then final recourse will have to be taken to decision-makers on the
world community level. But it is unfortunate to leave the impression
in codified law that the only "legal" recourse is compulsory submis-
sion to arbitral decision-makers whose tendency will be to limit the
dispute to arbitrable issues of conservation authority judged ex-
clusively by biological criteria. Within the framework of a regional
scheme the Commission can be authorized to adopt conservation meas-
ures subject to the right of member states to object within prescribed
time limits. 102 When the onus thus lies on the dissenting state to chal-
lenge the scheme's measures before it develops into a more damaging
kind of dispute the various aspects of regional policy can be drawn out
more easily than in the course of adversary hearings before an arbi-
trator, and it is perhaps easier to devise managerial techniques to
soften the impact of the adopted measures on the dissenting state.
It is believed, therefore, that a split-level system of fishery authority
would institute more rational and more equitable procedures in the
process of decision-making applied to the fisheries of the North Pacific.
"- Carroz & Roche, supra note 48, at 686-90.
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